In competitive knowledge-based economies, policymakers recognise the importance of universities' engagement in third mission activities. This paper investigates how a specific policy approach to encourage third mission engagement -the use of performance-based funding to reward universities' success in this domain -aligns with the broader goals of third mission policy. Considering the case of the United Kingdom (UK), the first country to have implemented a system of this kind, we analyse how the system has come into being and how it has evolved, and we discuss whether its implementation is likely to encourage universities to behave in ways that are aligned with the goals of third mission policy, as outlined in government documents. We argue that the system encourages universities to focus on a narrow range of income-producing third mission activities, and this is not well aligned with the policy goal to support a complex innovation ecosystem comprising universities with different third mission objectives and strategies. The paper concludes by proposing possible avenues for achieving greater alignment between incentives and policy goals.
Introduction
In order to create value for the economy and for society at large, universities are expected to actively engage with stakeholders from the private, public and third sectors (Grady and Pratt 2000) . The often-repeated argument that, by accelerating the rate of creation and distribution of knowledge, universities' engagement with external stakeholders can bring about greater economic prosperity (Howlett 2010; Vorley and Lawton-Smith 2007) , has underpinned what has been described as the 'second academic revolution' (Etzkowitz 2003) : universities have acquired a 'third mission' (Nelles and Vorley 2010 ) that consists of the 'generation, use, application and exploitation of knowledge and other university capabilities outside the academic environment' (Molas-Gallart et al. 2002, p.2) . This mission, now considered as important as teaching and research, can be pursued through various activities that include, but are not limited to, commercialising scientific research, collaborating with public and private organisations, providing education to audiences beyond traditional students, contributing to public debates and to cultural activities, and engaging in social and community regeneration processes (Bekkers and Bodas Freitas 2008; Hewitt-Dundas 2012; Laursen and Salter 2004; Lawton-Smith 2007; Perkmann and Walsh 2007) .
The third mission has been increasingly institutionalised within universities (Lockett, Wright and Wild 2014; Pinheiro, Langa and Pausits 2015) through actions like topdown strategic planning, changes in leadership and implementation of supporting organisational structures (Fumasoli, Pinheiro, and Stensaker 2014; Pinheiro and Stensaker 2014) . Policy pressures have been important drivers of institutionalisation (Sanchez-Barrioluengo 2014; Pinheiro, Langa and Pausits 2015) : since the late 1990s, policymakers in most countries have sought to encourage universities' engagement in some third mission activities, particularly the commercialisation of university research through patents and spinoff companies (Mowery and Sampat 2005; Geuna and Rossi 2011) , and research collaborations between university and industry (Bozeman 2000; Perkmann, Neely and Walsh 2011) . Key decisions for third mission policy involve the choice of which activities should be encouraged, and what incentives should be established to accomplish this. Incentives can be defined explicitly: for example, additional funds can be assigned to reward universities that perform certain activities particularly well. Incentives can also arise implicitly from the way in which performance is measured , for example through the choice of indicators used to construct rankings (Montesinos et al. 2008; Marhl and Pausits 2011) . Devising third mission support initiatives that, in promoting some channels of university engagement, do not hamper other productive efforts, poses an important challenge to policymakers. This paper explores how a particular approach to incentivising universities' engagement in third mission activities -the introduction of performance-based funding -aligns with the broader goals of third mission policy. We consider the case of the United Kingdom (UK), which is the first country to have implemented a comprehensive performance-based funding system for universities' third mission engagement: we analyse how the system has come into being and how it has evolved, and we discuss whether such system is likely to encourage universities to behave in ways that are aligned with the goals of third mission policy, as outlined in government documents. So far, few studies have attempted to empirically explore the implications of this funding system in terms of, among other things, how funds are distributed over time (does the system lead to funding being progressively concentrated in a few institution? Is the performance ranking stable?), and how it influences universities' strategies of engagement in different third mission activities and in the other two missions of teaching and research 1 . Complementing existing empirical studies, this paper develops a critical discussion of the incentives that the performance-based funding system is likely to generate, in light of the general goals of third mission policy. Analysing this issue is important, not just to identify potential weaknesses in the system that is being studied, but also to derive lessons that may be useful to policymakers elsewhere who are considering implementing similar approaches.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the design and implementation of third mission policy, focusing on the debate about the use and implications of performance indicators and performance reward systems. Section 3 reconstructs the main steps in the evolution of the policy discourse around universities' third mission agenda, based on an analysis of selected policy documents published by the UK government between 1993 and 2015. We examine the overarching policy goals outlined in these documents. Section 4 describes how a performance-based funding system for third mission engagement has been introduced in the UK, and how its implementation has evolved over time. Section 5 presents a critical discussion of the incentives that this system is likely to generate for universities, and of their alignment with the goals of third mission policy. Possible avenues for achieving greater alignment between policy incentives and policy goals are discussed in the final section.
1 Day and Fernandez (2015) explored the patterns of income growth from third mission activities in UK universities, highlighting a concentration trend; Rosli and Rossi (2015) and Rossi and Rosli (2015) analysed the limitations of current indicators in reflecting universities' actual third mission performance.
The implementation of performance indicators and funding systems in third mission policy
The implementation of the third mission agenda in universities has not occurred without controversy. Critics have highlighted potential conflicts with the other missions of the university, suggesting that the pursuit of this agenda may not only be detrimental to the university's search for research excellence (Florida 1999; Philpott et al. 2011) , but also to its mission to effectively produce qualified human capital through teaching (Sanchez- Barrioluengo 2014) . The distortions introduced by commercial incentives to the fundamental principles underpinning the scientific enterprise (Blumenthal et al. 1996; Murray and Stern 2007) might threaten universities' ability to fulfil all these roles simultaneously and to achieve some balance among their missions (European Commission 2011; Sanchez-Barrioluengo 2014) . Furthermore, the multiple rationales that underpin third mission activitiesfrom the pursuit of immediate economic gain, to broader community and regional development and the attainment of social goals -may lead to conflicting institutional strategies, and even conflicting policy goals and policy instruments (Flanagan et al. 2011; Mok 2005) .
In view of the increasing institutionalisation and permanence of third mission activities (Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen 2012) criticisms to third mission policy have also focused on pragmatic aspects of design and implementation, building on the argument that it is difficult to determine what constitutes successful performance in third mission activities, and what activities should policies target. Four main challenges in relation to third mission policy implementation can be identified from a review of the literature.
(i) Difficulty in identifying which third mission activities should be incentivised. The range of activities that fall within the realm of third mission is very broad (Perkmann et al. 2013) , and the choice of which ones should be incentivised is a politically contested issue (Docherty et al. 2012) , since different stakeholders might be invested in different activities. Lockett, Wright and Wild (2014) show that, in the UK, different associations representing different groups of university institutions had remarkably different views about what third mission entailed, and they actively sought to shape the discourse about the nature of third mission and the indicators used to measure engagement and success 2 .
(ii) Difficulty in evaluating successful performance. It is unclear what 'success' means with respect to third mission. Success should be evaluated on the basis of the outcomes of third mission activities, particularly the impacts that they produce on the economy and on society. However, this is problematic, because it is difficult to identify all the possible impacts to be measured, to decide the temporal interval after which impact should be assessed, and to ascertain the extent to which impact is directly due to the university's actions, as opposed to serendipity, luck and other factors beyond the university's control (Molas-Gallart et al. 2002; Meagher, Lyall and Nutley 2008) . For this reason, success is often evaluated on the basis of engagement measures rather than impact (Molas-Gallart et al. 2002; Robichau and Lynn 2009) .
(iii) Policy goals expressed in terms of indicators rather than of underlying outcomes.
Indicators have tended to take on a central role in policy implementation (Grupp and Mogee 2004; Sorlin 2007) , often leading policymakers to express their goals in terms 2 Following Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen (2012) we use the term 'measure' as a broader concept that also includes qualitative data, whereas the term 'indicator' refers to a specific quantitative unit. Thus, one measure may consist of several indicators. Measures and indicators may deal with inputs, outputs or outcomes (the latter are sometimes referred to as impacts) (Langford et al. 2006 ).
of achievement of indicators, rather than of the outcomes they are intended to proxy (Langford et al. 2006) . Molas-Gallart and Castro-Martinez (2007) suggest that indicators -besides being simple to handle (Sorensen and Chambers 2008) -have the advantage of allowing stakeholders to avoid potential gridlocks due to conflicting policy goals: in a context characterised by high ambiguity and high conflict (Matland 1995) , it is easier for stakeholders to agree on symbolic measures of performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) which appear objective and uncontroversial, rather than on the more ambiguous and conflicting policy goals that they are pursuing. These criticisms have become even more relevant in light of the increasing reliance on performance-based funding as a way to promote efficiency in universities (Geuna and Martin 2001; Hewitt-Dundas 2012) . Based on theories of action (Argyris and Schon 1996) , the rationale for the use of performance-based funding is that institutional performance can be improved through material incentives that mimic the profit motive for business (Dougherty and Hong 2006) , thus inducing organizational compliance with a set of intended policy goals (Etzioni, as cited in Matland 1995, p. 161 bracketing helps to decompose the data and identify specific theoretical mechanism recurring over time (Langley 1999; Langley et al. 2013 ).
We identified 25 key policy documents that are particularly relevant to understand the evolution of the government's policy goals in relation to university third mission 3 .
These documents have been published between 1993 and 2015 by the departments that, over time, have been in charge of higher education policy 4 and by the devolved higher education authorities. For each of these 25 documents, we identified the general policy goal to be addressed, the specific goal identified in relation to third mission, and the key recommendations made in order to achieve such third mission policy goals. A table summarizing these is presented as a supplementary file.
Temporal bracketing has led us to identify three key overlapping periods in the evolution of third mission policy goals.
Early 1990s -early 2000s: Third mission engagement as technology transfer
The UK government's concern with supporting university-industry technology transfer began in the 1970s, when a widespread debate on the UK's presumed failure to exploit research emerged (Grady and Pratt 2000) . Initial interventions to answer the problem were fragmented, the government's aspirations were unclear, and synergies among government, university and industry were lacking. In, 1993 the white paper 
Early 2000s-2010s: Third mission engagement as knowledge transfer
During the 2000s, policy documents began to reflect a more nuanced view of third mission engagement, supported by growing empirical evidence highlighting the diversity of engagement channels (Jones and Craven 2001; Wright et al. 2008; Meagher, Lyall and Nutley 2008) . It was recognised, particularly on the basis of evidence from the US (Chakrabarti and Santoro 2004; Mowery and Sampat 2005) , that the commercialisation of patents and licenses and the sale of shares in spinoffs did not generate much revenue for most universities (Lockett, Wright and Wild 2014) and that emphasizing intellectual property rights could hamper knowledge-sharing recommended that third mission funding should be spread more widely across the sector.
During the 2000s, particular attention was paid to the regional dimension of universities' third mission (Potts 2002 Commission 2011 Commission , 2015 .
Early 2010s onwards: Third mission engagement as knowledge exchange
Since the 2010s, the government's aspirations have broadened further. Universities are expected to be part of ecosystems of innovation characterised by collaboration and exchange among a variety of stakeholders, aimed at addressing complex social and economic challenges (Andersen, Brinkley and Hutton 2011; BIS 2015) . The term 'knowledge exchange', which emphasises the two-way, collaborative nature of the interactions between universities and businesses (or other stakeholders) began to gain ground (DIUS 2008; BIS 2012 BIS , 2013a BIS , 2015 .
The 'Innovation Nation' white paper (DIUS 2008b) funding allocation should support LEPs partnering with local universities, which would enhance the locality's competitive advantages and leverage their co-location to generate growth (BIS 2013c (BIS , 2014b (BIS , 2015 . However, how policies in support and innovation and knowledge transfer can be implemented in the LEP context remains unclear. This might have had the consequence of discouraging universities to pursue an agenda of contributing to regional development as a key form of engagement, and rather focus on different objectives. Little empirical evidence exists at the moment to argue whether this has been the case. Since the mid-1990s, in parallel with the setting out of policy goals in government documents, several policy instruments were launched with the objective to encourage and support universities' third mission engagement. While performance-based funding systems have been implemented in all four UK countries, the particular sets of instruments and the details of their implementation differ (Huggins and Kitagawa 2012) . Our analysis focuses on England, which hosts the majority of university institutions in the UK, and where the switch to performance-based funding has been more marked. We track the consolidation of different instruments into a single funding stream, whose allocation has progressively changed from competitive to performance-based, and the evolution in the formula used for the allocation.
The implementation of a performance-based funding system for third mission engagement
While several stand-alone initiatives supporting university-industry collaborations around research and training had been implemented in the UK since the mid-1970s, Trade and Industry (DTI) and allocated by HEFCE, the HEROBAC fund initially was set at £60m over four years (HEFCE 1999) . From the start, the intention was to turn it into a permanent third stream of funding, aimed at developing the capability of universities to engage with business and the wider community, by setting up appropriate organisational and structural arrangements. This has been justified in terms of a change in the fund's objectives. The funds allocated competitively in the first period of the HEIF (HEIF1 and HEIF2) were supposed to help institutions build their third mission capability, by setting up appropriate infrastructures and developing competences (Grady and Pratt 2000) . The rationale for performance-based funding was to reward and encourage excellence in third mission activities alongside research and teaching (HEFCE 2011) . This switch was progressive: while HEIF3 and HEIF4 introduced formula-based funding, this constituted only part of the overall allocation with the remaining part still being allocated competitively. Since HEIF5, the allocation is entirely formula-based. The evolution of the allocation mechanism is shown in Table 2 . 
2011-2015

2015-2016
HEIF 5 100% 100%
Source: Authors' elaboration based on data from HEIF reports, available from http://www.hefce.ac.uk/kess/heif/ (last accessed January 2016).
Characteristics of the implementation of performance-based funding
Once the performance-based funding system was established in 2006, its implementation involved the decision to link it to a formula based on quantitative indicators of performance, rather than, for example, some form of qualitative assessment. The formula also changed over time, with increasing weight assigned to income from third mission activities.
In HEIF3, the formula (which was used to allocate 75% of the HEIF funding) was based on a set of 12 indicators derived from several sources (Kitagawa and Lightowler 2012; Molas-Gallart and Castro-Martinez 2007) . These indicators included income from intellectual property exploitation, regeneration and development, and non-credit bearing courses, as well as data on student placements, engagement with noncommercial organizations, staff dedicated to third mission activities, and overall number of staff of the university (Molas-Gallart and CastroMartinez 2007). In HEIF4, 100% of funds were allocated via formula, and the formula was based on a combination of number of staff and income from a set of third mission activities. Income from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was double-weighted (Kitagawa and Lightowler 2012) . In HEIF5, all funds were allocated via formula, and the formula was entirely based on the income that universities accrued from third mission activities 8 . Again, income from SMEs was double weighted.
Moreover, a more stringent approach to funds allocation was adopted, from granting the funds lump sum (HEIF1-HEIF3) to administering the allocation yearly (HEIF4, HEIF5). This required universities to adopt a more strategic approach to planning for their third mission activities within the specific HEIF period. There was also a move towards greater concentration of funds, with an increase in the maximum award received by each university (£2.85 million for HEIF5) and the introduction of a threshold, whereby only universities earning more than £250,000 were eligible to receive HEIF funds. While the presence of a cap on the maximum and minimum changes in funding allocations allowed year-on-year should have tempered the process of funding concentration (allocations could increase by 50% at most, and could not drop by more than 50%), evidence suggests that the latest HEIF rounds have increased funding concentration (Coates Ulrichsen 2014; Day and Fernandez 2015) . Since the transition to 100% formula funding in HEIF4, growth rates in third mission incomes have increased more in those institutions that already had higher income, reversing a previously established trend whereby smaller institutions used to have higher third mission income growth (Day and Fernandez 2015) . Moreover, HEIF5 (2011 allocated around £26 million additional funding to top performers, which further increased concentration. HEIF funding for [2015] [2016] followed the methods used from 2011 to 2015 for the main HEIF allocations (£150 million) and included additional awards for the top performing institutions (£10 million) (HEFCE 2015) . 9 Details of the evolution of HEIF allocation mechanisms are summarised in Table 3 . Although the information collected after 2002 was initially not too dissimilar from that collected in previous editions of the survey, in practice collating all the quantitative information in a separate section made it easier to detach it from qualitative information about the context in which it was generated, and it can be argued that this facilitated the transition toward a system in which the only part that mattered for policy implementation was the quantitative one. Analysing the quantitative part of the survey, Figure 4 shows that the relative importance of various thematic areas has changed, consistently with the overall changes introduced in the survey: rising importance of intellectual property, provision of facilities and equipment services, consultancy and contract research, and, again, progressive loss of importance of spinoff companies and regeneration programmes. Therefore, even though third mission policy increasingly encouraged a focus on a broad set of third mission activities, arising from a variety of academic disciplines, in practice the survey attributed progressively greater importance to a few activities likely to generate income to the university, many of which are also associated with technological and scientific subjects. The loss of importance of regeneration programmes, spinoff companies and skills provision themes reflected a shift away from the regional dimension of knowledge exchange, with progressively greater importance attributed to the achievement of excellence on a national scale rather than to the involvement in interactions with local stakeholders. The reduced focus on strategies and policies also suggests a shift away from more intangible aspects of engagement and towards more tangible, quantifiable outputs. The goals of third mission policy in the UK have evolved from a narrower focus on supporting technology transfer from university to industry, to a broader focus on promoting the development of innovation ecosystems where universities engage with many stakeholders, through different channels and activities, in order to address complex social and economic challenges.
Can a performance-based funding system support the pursuit of such complex policy goals for third mission policy? In theory, this might be possible as long as this system provides incentives for universities to develop third mission strategies that best exploit their relative strengths and competitive advantages (Sánchez-Barrioluengo 2014) and, within those strategies, encourages them to focus on the activities that generate the greatest positive socioeconomic impacts.
However, the four arguments that we presented earlier suggest that in practice it is a challenge to devise a performance-based funding system that supports these complex goals, and we argue that these challenges are present in the system implemented in the UK.
(i) Difficulty in identifying which third mission activities should be incentivised.
Policy documents have acknowledged that different universities may adopt different models of engagement while equally fulfilling their third mission remit (BIS 2012).
However, some forms of engagement are more amenable to performance measurement: for example, activities that produce returns that can be quantified in monetary terms, rather than activities whose returns are more intangible. Therefore, performance measure systems are more likely to focus on the former. In the UK, the amount and quality of information collected about the university's third mission strategies, policies and infrastructure has been reduced, while greater importance has been assigned to activities that can be measured by quantitative indicators, in particular income. Moreover, the set of quantitative indicators have progressively focused on a narrower range of activities , moving away from skills provision, entrepreneurship and local regeneration, and focusing more on research contracts, consultancies and especially intellectual property. This seems to increasingly privilege the collection of quantitative information about the 'technology transfer' model of third mission engagement, which has instead been progressively abandoned by policy thinking.
(ii) Difficulty in evaluating successful performance. Policy should encourage universities to focus on third mission activities that are more impactful, rather than simply to engage in a lot of activities with limited impact. Nevertheless, measuring the impact of third mission activities is difficult (Molas-Gallart et al. 2002) and this often leads to a focus on measuring engagement. But measuring third mission engagement and assessing impact are different things, and it cannot be assumed that certain activities are always impactful and should therefore be promoted (Perkmann et al. 2013 ) for all types of universities (Sánchez-Barrioluengo 2014).
In the UK, the formula used to allocate funds has relied on a progressively narrow range of indicators of engagement, most recently including only income. It has been observed that higher income does not always mean greater impact (Coates Ulrichsen 2014; Rossi and Rosli 2015) , as it can be connected with reputation or with the higher cost of engaging with stakeholders in particular subjects, while lower income, rather than denote lack of impact, may be due to engagement with particular types of beneficiaries, such as disadvantaged socioeconomic groups (Hatakenaka 2005) , or to engagement in particularly risky and uncertain activities .
Although these objections do not completely undermine the usefulness of using income as a guide for tracking impact 10 , nonetheless the exclusive use of income as a guide for distributing funding contains an implicit incentive to move away from activities that are not income-producing (which are poorly measured in the survey, on the one hand, and do not form the basis for reward, on the other) and, among income producing activities, to focus on those whose returns are less risky and which are more highly remunerated.
(iii) Policy goals expressed in terms of quantitative indicators rather than of underlying outcomes, and (iv) performative effects of indicators on institutional
behaviour. Because the system rewards institutions whose model of third mission engagement leads them to generate higher income from a certain set of activities, it could induce some universities to change their strategy of engagement to fit this model, even when it is not suited to their specific strengths, and when engagement in other non income-producing activities may be more socially beneficial Lockett, Wright and Wild 2014; Dougherty and Reddy 2013) . In particular, it might encourage universities to see their interactions with businesses within a context of short-term revenue generation, rather than for longer-term economic and public benefit (Guldbrandsen and Rasmussen 2012).
The formula used particularly rewards larger institutions (University Alliance 2011;
Coates Ulrichsen 2014), since it is based on income levels rather than on income per capita or income growth . Moreover, compared to the more forward-looking competitive approach, the formula is entirely based on past 10 HEFCE (2011) justified the use of income-based formula allocation as a means to 'incentivise and support those HEIs that can make the greatest contribution to the economy and society' as 'income remains the best proxy we have for the impact of KE [knowledge exchange] activities on the economy and society ' (HEFCE, 2011). performance and rewards institutions that have been successful in the past (Coates Ulrichsen 2014). Making policy choices based upon past accomplishment (Kay 2006) not only reinforces the status quo, but also stifles variety in the system by hindering experimentation.
Because of these issues, the funding system is not well aligned with the objective to While, to our knowledge, no studies have so far attempted to empirically assess whether UK universities' third mission strategies have actually changed in response to the incentives generated by the performance-based funding system, and while the amount of funds distributed through this system is small relative to their overall public funds allocations (although it is instrumental in producing about a third of universities' third mission income, Coates Ulrichsen 2014), it is nonetheless important to be aware of the incentives that this system is likely to create and of the potential misalignment with broader policy goals so that similar approaches are not adopted uncritically elsewhere.
Interestingly, some third mission programmes that used performance-based funding have moved back to competitive allocation. Guldbrandsen and Rasmussen (2012) describe the case of the FORNY programme in Norway, where the use of a formula to reward performance created incentives for technology transfer offices to strategically change their behaviour in undesirable ways. This led to many changes in the formula and to its eventual abandonment for purposes of fund allocation. In Scotland, the SFC claimed that formula-based funding allocations 'have not resulted in a strong, strategic focus on Scotland's biggest challenges or opportunities' (THE 19 June 2010, cited in Kitagawa and Lightowler 2012, p.9) , recognizing their failure to fulfil broader policy goals.
Conclusions and avenues for further research
To be successful in supporting policy goals, instruments and their implementation need to be clearly linked to the goals they intend to facilitate. This is particularly departments, acknowledging that the mode of third mission engagement tends to vary across subject areas. Another approach could be to mix different instruments through a 'policy-mix' approach (Nauwelaers et al. 2009 ). In complex, unpredictable contexts, flexibility in achieving a goal is better supported by the concept of equifinality (Gresov and Drazin 1997; Kapsali 2011) , by having different possible trajectoriespaths to reach the goal. The 'policy-mix' approach would imply returning to a mix of different instruments supporting specific types of third mission activities and/or supporting them in different ways, possibly with greater coordination with the instruments made available by other funding agencies (research councils, funding trusts, local governments etc.). This would require interaction between funding agencies to clarify the characteristics and objectives of the planned instruments (Dolfsma and Seo 2013) and to coordinate the degree of differentiation between the instruments, and how they may be coupled with the structure of the policy objectives (Bach, Matt and Wolff 2014) .
While the objective of this work was to showcase the difficulty in aligning the incentives created by performance-based funding with the complex goals of third mission policy, the patterns that have emerged from it could be further explored by investigating the implications of performance based-funding on universities' strategic behaviour through empirical analyses exploiting available data on universities' strategic priorities, income and engagement in different activities.
